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Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice:  
 
The International Criminal Court and an  
Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation 
 
William W. Burke-White* & Scott Kaplan∗∗ 
 
In December 2003, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni referred crimes 
committed in Northern Uganda to the nascent International Criminal Court (ICC).1  The 
Rome Statute of the ICC had entered into force one and a half years earlier,2 and 
Uganda’s referral was the first made under Article 14, which allows States Parties to refer 
a situation to the Prosecutor for investigation.3   Although it was originally assumed that 
this provision would be used by non-territorial states to refer crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction to the Prosecutor, Uganda made the first so-called self-referral to the ICC, 
seeking the Court’s assistance with the apprehension and prosecution of the leadership of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).4 
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While the author has served as a Visiting Scholar at the International Criminal Court and has advised the 
Ugandan government on issues related to the cases discussed here, this work represents the individual 
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1 Press Release, International Criminal Court, President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, (Jan. 24, 2004) (available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&l=en.html ).  Museveni’s decision came after a substantial military 
campaign, Operation Iron Fist, failed to end – and, in fact, escalated – the conflict.  Facing pressure from 
the international community over the humanitarian crisis that followed the campaign, Museveni’s decision 
to refer the Northern Uganda situation was widely perceived as an effort to regain international support.  
See UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, LIU INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME, NORTHERN UGANDA – HUMAN SECURITY UPDATE 2 (May 2005). 
2 Ratification of the Rome Statute by the 60th member state occurred on 1 July 2002. 
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 14 July 12, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 900 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] 
4 See generally, Mohamed El-Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the 
Complementarity Principle: An Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. 
REV. 83 (2005) (discussing legal implications of Uganda’s self-referral); Kasiaja Phillip Apuuli, The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Insurgency in Northern 
Uganda, 15 CRIM. L. FORUM 391 (2004); Håkan Friman, The International Criminal Court: Investigations 
into crimes committed in the DRC and Uganda. What is next?, 13 AFR. SECURITY REV. 19, 21-22 (2004); 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC – Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM JUST. 421, 424-25 (2006); Katherine 
Southwick, Investigating War in Northern Uganda: Dilemmas for the International Criminal Court, 1 
YALE J. INT’L AFF.105 (2005).  For a critical review of the ICC’s role in the Ugandan conflict, see Adam 
Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 179 (2007). 
Since 1986, the LRA has been engaged in a campaign against Museveni’s 
government5 in northern Uganda that has included abduction and enslavement of 
children, murder and rape of civilians, attacks on displaced-persons camps, and other 
atrocities constituting crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute.6 Despite the 
longevity of the conflict, its brutal nature, and multiple rounds of negotiations the 
Ugandan government has been unable to reach either a political or a military solution and 
the international community had largely neglected the situation.7  As of early April 2008, 
such a settlement appears close, but may yet remain elusive. 
For Museveni, referral of the situation in Uganda to the ICC was essentially a 
political calculation that offered several advantages.8  Referral to the Court provided an 
opportunity to raise the international profile of the conflict, to pressure the LRA and its 
supporters—particularly Sudan9—and to transfer the political and financial costs of 
apprehension and prosecution to international actors. Through such a referral, Museveni 
could make a credible threat to the LRA that, should they remain at large, they would be 
apprehended and face prosecution, thereby, hopefully, increasing their willingness to 
negotiate a settlement.10 Simultaneously, Museveni could make it more costly for the 
Sudanese government to support the LRA.11 In addition, Museveni’s referral had the 
benefit of potentially shifting the significant domestic political costs—particularly in 
                                                 
5 For a more complete discussion of the conflict between Uganda and the LRA, see Frank Van Aker, 
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: the new order no one ordered, 103 AFR. AFF. 335 (2004).  For 
detailed accounts of human rights violations committed in Northern Uganda, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
UPROOTED AND FORGOTTEN: IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN NORTHERN UGANDA 14-36 (2005).  
For personal accounts of the effects of the conflict, see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION 
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, REGIONAL SUPPORT OFFICE FOR CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICA, “WHEN THE SUN 
SETS WE START TO WORRY”:  AN ACCOUNT OF LIFE IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2004). 
6 Rome Statute art. 7, Crimes Against Humanity 
7 See Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral 
to the International Criminal Court, 99 Am. J. of Int’l L. 403, 410 (2005) (describing international 
reluctance to become involved in the Northern Uganda situation). 
8 For analysis of  a similar self-referral decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo, see 
Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global 
Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557 (2005). 
9 See, e.g., Mareike Schomerus, Small Arms Survey Working Paper, The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: 
A History and Overview 24-27 (2007); Northern Uganda And Sudan's Support For The Lord's Resistance 
Army, Testimony of Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch, before the United States House Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Africa (July 29, 1998), available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sudan98/testim/house-07.htm#TopOfPage.  
10 See, William W. Burke-White, Peace vs. Justice or Peace & Justice, draft manuscript on file with author. 
11 See, e.g., Nick Grono & Adam O’Brien, International Crisis Group, Opinion: Exorcising the Ghost of the 
ICC, The Monitor, Oct. 31, 2006 (“The ICC’s intervention . . . complicated Khartoum’s continued support 
of the LRA, helping sever the LRA’s supply lines and uproot their secure safe havens.”) 
Northern Uganda—of prosecuting LRA members away from his government and onto 
the ICC.12 Finally, such a referral to the ICC offered the prospect of international acclaim 
in light of strong pressure from European governments for Uganda to become the first 
state to refer a situation to the ICC. 
Subsequent to the Ugandan referral and an investigation by the ICC, the Court 
returned indictments against five LRA leaders.13 Soon thereafter, in late June 2006, the 
LRA expressed willingness to engage in a new round of peace talks with the Ugandan 
government.14 Despite numerous past failures, this latest round of negotiations came to 
appear far more promising than any of the previous efforts. There are likely a variety of 
reasons for the relative success of the 2006 negotiations. First, it is possible that the ICC 
indictments had their intended effect of making the war more costly for the LRA and 
promoting settlement discussions. Secondly, the peace agreement in Sudan and a new 
willingness of the South Sudanese government to moderate talks helped catalyze and 
support the peace process.15 Finally, newfound international pressure—perhaps also the 
result of ICC involvement—created incentives for both the LRA and the Ugandan 
government to soften their stance and consider dialogue.16    
                                                 
12See William Burke-White, A Community of Courts:  Toward a System of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1, 50-52 (analyzing East Timor’s decision to embrace internationalized 
judicial panels for prosecutions opposed by Indonesia, thereby externalizing the political costs onto the 
international community). 
13 The warrants were issued by Pre-trial Chamber II on 8 July of 2005, but remained sealed until 13 
October 2005.  International Criminal Court, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for unsealing of the 
warrants of arrest, ICC-02/04-01/05-52 (Oct. 13, 2005). One of the indictees has since been confirmed dead 
(see, Press Release, International Criminal Court, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
on the confirmation of the death of Raska Lukwiya (Oct. 11, 2006)).  Two others, Vincent Otti and 
Dominic Ongwen have been widely reported to have been killed.  However, DNA tests on Ongwen’s 
supposed corpse revealed that the body found was not in fact his and the Court considers the warrants 
against him to remain in force (see Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Unseals Results of 
Dominic Ongwen DNA Tests (Jul. 7, 2006).  The Office of the Prosecutor has alerted Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of the reports of Otti’s death, and has requested information from Uganda and the DR Congo (see Office of 
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Submission of Information Regarding Vincent Otti 2, ICC-
02/04-01/05-258 (Nov. 8, 2007). 
14 See, e.g., BBC News, LRA Rebels Arrive for Sudan Talks, June 8, 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5060666.stm (noting that Joseph Kony’s call for an end to the conflict 
came after a promise of safety under the threat of ICC indictments). 
15 See H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit,, President of Southern Sudan and First Vice President of Sudan, Remarks 
at The Role of Southern Sudan in Regional Peace and Security, Woodrow Wilson Center for International 
Scholars (July 24, 2006), available at: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=195133 (discussing 
Southern Sudan’s role in peace negotiations involving the LRA). 
16 See, e.g., Council of the European, Council Conclusions on Uganda, Document No. 9357/06, at ¶¶3-6 
(May 15, 2006) (Reaffirming the Council’s positions that “The Government of Uganda has the primary 
Whatever its ultimate cause, the relative success of the peace negotiations quickly 
changed the preferences and negotiating positions of the LRA and the Ugandan 
government. Early in the negotiations, it became clear that, notwithstanding the fact that 
the ICC indictments may have forced the LRA to the negotiating table, they would be a 
stumbling block in any potential peace agreement. The LRA leadership repeatedly stated 
that the withdrawal of ICC indictments was a prerequisite to ultimate settlement.17 In late 
June 2007, the Ugandan government and the LRA reached an agreement laying out the 
principles of justice and accountability for settlement of the conflict, which contemplated 
domestic proceedings with alternative sentences and possibly even the use of traditional 
justice mechanisms.  The agreement’s section on sentencing highlights the delicate 
balance necessary for LRA approval, noting the need for a novel sentencing scheme 
involving “a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions, which shall . . . replace exiting 
penalties, with respect to serious crimes and human rights violations committed by non-
state actors.”18  It defined the purpose of these alternative penalties in terms of promoting 
reconciliation, rehabilitation and reparations, while “reflect[ing] the gravity of the 
crimes.”19   
Despite the flexibility with respect to justice and accountability indicated in the 
agreement reached at the peace talks, almost to the day the ICC Prosecutor took an 
extremely firm line in a major public address in Nuremberg, Germany, essentially 
excluding any possibility that his office would seek to have the warrants withdrawn.20 In 
the words of the Prosecutor: “for each situation in which the ICC is exercising 
jurisdiction, we can hear voices challenging judicial decisions, their timing, their 
timeliness, asking the Prosecution to use its discretionary powers to adjust to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsibility for addressing the conflict [in Northern Uganda] and the grave humanitarian impact it has 
had” and welcoming “the increased involvement of the UN with regard to the conflict with the LRA, and in 
particular UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1653 and 1663 which call for UN Secretary General 
recommendations for tackling illegal armed groups, including the LRA.”) 
17   See Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ICC Looms over Peace 
Negotiations, Jan. 7, 2008 (“LRA negotiators . . . contend that as long as the indictments exist, no peace 
deal will be signed, nor will they come out of the bush.”). 
18 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of The Republic of Uganda 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement ¶6.3, June 29, 2007 (on file with author). 
19 Id. at ¶6.4. 
20 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Address at Building a Future 
on Peace and Justice, June 25, 2007.  
situations on the ground. . . . These proposals are not consistent with the Rome Statute. 
They undermine the law that states committed to.”21 
As a result, the ICC was seen by many as a roadblock on the path to peace.22 The 
withdrawal of warrants was a prerequisite to settlement for the LRA and the Prosecutor 
refused to use his powers under Article 53 of the Rome Statute to seek to have those 
warrants withdrawn.23 A peace deal appeared elusive.  The Ugandan government and 
various mediators began to explore other options to possibly relieve the pressure on the 
LRA that stemmed from the ICC warrants without entirely sacrificing the goals of 
accountability. The possibility of some form of domestic proceedings in Uganda 
rendering the case inadmissible at the ICC, pursuant to the complementarity provisions of 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, emerged as the most promising alternative. According to 
Article 17, as long as such a domestic proceeding was a genuine effort to bring the 
indictees to justice, it would bar the case from being heard by the ICC and, thereby, make 
settlement a more promising alternative for the LRA.  To that end, in late February 2008, 
an Annexure to the Agreement was reached between the LRA and the Ugandan 
government, expressly providing for the establishment of a special division of the High 
                                                 
21 Id.  
22   Such sentiments have been expressed by a wide range of commentators, including NGOs, regional 
commentators and the international press.  See e.g., John Prendergast, Enough Project, What to do about 
Joseph Kony, Enough Strategy Paper 8 (October 2007) (“until there is agreement about how to deal with 
Kony and his top deputies -- all indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against 
humanity -- there will be no peace deal”); Kony Demands Peace, 43 Africa Research Bulletin: Political, 
Cultural & Social Series 16659B (2006) (“[P]rospects for peace are complicated by the arrest warrants 
issued by the international criminal court for Kony and four of his commanders in 2005. Betty Bigombe, 
Uganda's negotiator with the LRA, pointed out that this left no incentive for the indicted men to lay down 
their arms.”); BBC News, Uganda Rejects Key Peace Demand, Feb. 28, 2008, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7268529.stm (noting Kony’s refusal to demobilize without assurances that 
the ICC warrants are dropped); André-Michel Essoungou. Chantage à la paix en Ouganda, LE MONDE 
DIPLOMATIQUE, April 2007 at 13 (recounting the hostile reaction of Ugandans in an internally-displaced 
persons camp towards the ICC and their view that the Court was a barrier to peace). 
23 Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 53(2)(c) (Allowing the prosecutor to conclude, after investigation, 
that no reasonable basis for prosecution exists because “[a] prosecution is not in the interests of justice, 
taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the 
age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime’).  This decision can be 
challenged either by the referring state or the Pre-Trial chamber (Id. at art. 53(3)(a)&(b), but in the Uganda 
situation neither is likely to challenge such a conclusion.  The prosecutor is able to revisit this decision “at 
any time” in light of “new facts or information.”  (Id. at art. 53(4)).  This would imply that there are limited 
costs to such a deferral, however the language of section 2(c) implies a balancing based on the temporal 
and physical proximity of the perpetrator to the crimes and the magnitude of the crimes committed.  It does 
not articulate balancing factors based on the prospects for future peace, and, indeed, none of the factors are 
forward-looking. 
Court of Uganda for the purposes of investigating and prosecuting crimes committed 
during the conflict.24  
Domestic criminal proceedings, as alternatives to ICC investigation and 
prosecution, are clearly consistent with the goals of the ICC as a court of complementary 
jurisdiction.25 Indeed, in a 2003 speech to States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo noted that “the first task of the prosecutor’s office [is 
to] make its best effort to help national jurisdictions fulfill their mission.”26 Moreover, the 
Pre-trial Chamber’s (PTC) initial determination that the case was admissible before the 
Court in part rested on the fact that Uganda was unable to achieve physical jurisdiction 
over the indictees, who had sought refuge in Congo.27 Should those indictees reach a 
peace agreement with the Ugandan government and return to Ugandan territory to face 
criminal proceedings, the case against them could become inadmissible under the Rome 
Statute.  
While domestic proceedings against LRA indictees in Uganda offers a possible 
compromise to avoid ICC prosecution without completely sacrificing accountability, it 
also raises a number of important questions not answered in the Rome Statute, by the 
Court itself, or yet subject to significant scholarly inquiry. For example, given Uganda’s 
self-referral, can the Ugandan government still challenge the admissibility of a case? 
How much flexibility in terms of the procedure and sentencing in any domestic 
prosecution will the ICC PTC still deem to constitute a genuine investigation or 
prosecution? Can such a domestic prosecution be devised that would satisfy both the 
LRA leadership and the PTC? How should the PTC evaluate Ugandan domestic justice 
efforts? These questions have become all the more pressing after the June 2007 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Ugandan government and 
                                                 
24 Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Lords Resistance 
Army/Movement and the Government of Uganda, Feb. 19, 2008 [hereinafter February 2008 Agreement] 
25 William Burke-White, Proactive Complimentarity:  The International Criminal Court and National 
Courts in the Rome Statute, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 53 (2008). 
26 Luis Moreno Ocampo, Statement to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court ICC-OTP-20030502-10-En (Apr. 22, 2003). 
27 Prosecutor v Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Article 58 (July 5, 2005). 
the LRA and the February 2008 Annexure that clearly call for domestic prosecutions with 
alternative sentences and, perhaps, even elements of traditional justice.28  
This chapter responds to these questions raised by the prospect of a domestic 
prosecution of the LRA leadership in Uganda and the possibility of an admissibility 
challenge before the ICC. In so doing, the chapter advances a framework for 
understanding admissibility and evaluating any admissibility challenge that might be 
brought. Moreover, the chapter suggests that the decision of the PTC on the admissibility 
of the Uganda cases, in light of a domestic investigation or prosecution, gives the ICC an 
extraordinary opportunity to define the contours of acceptable national prosecutions 
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute and, particularly, to develop a framework for 
balancing the legitimate desire of national governments to achieve peace and justice after 
a conflict with the international legal duty of states parties to the Rome Statute to 
undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions of international crimes.  
The article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the law and practice of 
admissibility challenges before the ICC, particularly in the case of self-referrals. Part II 
offers three distinct visions of the concept of admissibility with implications for the 
PTC’s analysis of any challenge in the Uganda cases. Part III considers the negotiations 
between the LRA and the Ugandan government as of April 2008 and analyzes the range 
of potential domestic justice mechanisms that might be available to Uganda, taking into 
consideration both the requirements of Article 17 of the Rome Statute and the agreements 
between the government and the LRA. Part IV evaluates the prospects for admissibility 
challenges either by the Ugandan government or by a particular indictee in light of the 
three visions of admissibility developed in Part II, and suggests that the PTC has a critical 
role both in resolving the conflict in Uganda and setting the contours of acceptable 
domestic justice efforts.  
 
 
I. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CHALLENGING ADMISSIBILITY 
 
                                                 
28 Agreement on Accountability, supra note 18. 
The Rome Statute appears to offer relatively clear rules as to the admissibility of 
cases and the procedures for challenging admissibility. Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the 
Statute provide both the circumstances in which cases will be admissible and the means 
through which particular states or the accused can challenge admissibility. The Uganda 
situation, however, raises important new questions about admissibility, largely because 
Uganda self-referred the situation on its territory to the ICC. Such self-referrals were not 
generally contemplated during the drafting of the Rome Statute and, therefore, the Statute 
does not clearly articulate the implications of self-referrals for complementarity and the 
admissibility of cases before the ICC. Yet, the admissibility of cases in circumstances of 
self-referrals has implications for the operation of the Court far beyond Uganda as the 
majority of the Court’s caseload to date has come through such self-referrals.29 Namely, 
the situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and the Central 
African Republic have all come through self-referrals and the Prosecutor has indicated a 
desire for the enhanced state cooperation that is likely to come with self-referrals.30  
The possible legal implications for self-referral on complementarity and 
admissibility are numerous. First, when a case has been self-referred, do the Prosecutor 
and the PTC nonetheless have to evaluate admissibility pursuant to Article 17 prior to the 
opening of an investigation or the issuance of arrest warrants? Second, would a change in 
the factual circumstances on the ground that initially precluded the territorial state from 
undertaking a genuine national investigation or prosecution and, hence, made the case 
initially admissible, preclude the Court from proceeding with the case? Third, does the 
act of self-referral waive either the right of the state or the right of the accused to 
subsequently challenge admissibility? More generally, how much flexibility should the 
PTC give to national governments to design their own domestic proceedings consistent 
with Article 17 of the Rome Statute, particularly in the context of efforts to bring an 
ongoing conflict, such as that in Northern Uganda, to a peaceful conclusion?  
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Claus Kress, ‘Self-referrals’ and Waivers of Complementarity’:  Some Considerations in Law 
and Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944, 944 (describing the move from state-referrals as a “rare exception” 
in any situation to the promotion of self-referrals). 
30  OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 2 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_policy.html (examining the various areas 
where cooperation is essential to the function of the Office of the Prosecutor). 
 
Each of these questions alone is significant. Taken collectively, they raise an even 
more fundamental question about the very nature of admissibility as a legal construct. Is 
admissibility a statutory limitation on the power of the ICC, a legal entitlement of states 
parties to the Rome Statute, or a right of defendants before the Court? Understanding and 
answering this deeper legal question provides an important framework for exploring the 
implications of self-referrals for the admissibility of cases before the ICC and any 
subsequent admissibility challenges. Moreover, the nature of admissibility provides 
critical perspective on the relationship of the ICC and states parties to the Rome Statute.  
 
 
A.  The Statutory Basis of Admissibility 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute limits the admissibility of cases before the Court.  
In order for a case to be admissible, the Court must first satisfy itself that the domestic 
authorities of some state are not already meaningfully pursuing the case. Specifically, the 
Rome Statute provides that cases are inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and 
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject 
of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, 
paragraph 3…31 
 
A state is deemed unwilling to prosecute if the proceedings are “undertaken . . . for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility;”32 or in cases 
where there is either an unjustified delay in the proceedings or the proceedings are not 
independent and impartial in a manner “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.”33 Inability is based on a consideration of “whether, due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to 
                                                 
31 Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a)-(c). 
32 Id at 17(2)(a). 
33 Id at 17(2)(b)&(c). 
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings.”34   
Admissibility determinations arise at a number of stages in any investigation and 
prosecution and involve both the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the PTC. First, even 
before formally seeking to open an investigation, the Prosecutor must determine that any 
case he would likely bring would presumably be admissible. In his decision to initiate an 
investigation or prosecution, the Prosecutor must, under Article 53, “consider whether the 
case would be admissible under Article 17.”35 Even after the initiation of an 
investigation, the Statute further requires the Prosecutor to engage in a continuing 
evaluation of national judicial efforts and to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber if there are no 
grounds for prosecution because a genuine national proceeding has made the case 
inadmissible.36 
The principle of complementarity has different legal implications for the 
Prosecutor at two separate phases of investigation. The first phase, the situational phase, 
arises when the Prosecutor makes an initial decision to investigate a particular situation. 
The second phase, the case phase, arises subsequently, when the Prosecutor identifies a 
particular suspect and develops an investigative hypothesis as to the crimes that suspect 
may have committed.37 At both of these stages, the Prosecutor must scrupulously 
consider actions by sates that might bar admissibility. 
At the situational phase, complementarity requires the OTP to undertake a general 
examination of whether the cases the Prosecutor might decide to undertake are already 
being investigated or prosecuted by national authorities.38 Where efforts by states to 
                                                 
34 Id at 17(3). 
35 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1)(b). 
36 Id. art. 53(2). 
37 For the distinction between situations and cases, see Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, 
VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, and VPRS6, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006). See also Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, The 
Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE—ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 175, 180-82 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). On the same 
distinction, but in the context of Security Council referrals, see Lionel Yee, The International Criminal 
Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE—ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 147-148 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
38 Pursuant to Article 53(1)(b), when seeking to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor “shall consider 
whether . . . the case is or would be admissible.” Such a preliminary admissibility determination requires 
the Prosecutor to have reasonable grounds for believing that admissibility would not be barred by reasons 
of complementarity. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1)(b). 
investigate or to prosecute within a given situation are sufficient and genuine, the 
complementarity analysis at this phase would suggest that investigation by the OTP is 
inappropriate. In contrast, where national proceedings have not been initiated, have been 
initiated only with respect to certain groups of suspects (such as lower level perpetrators), 
or where there is reason to believe national proceedings are less than genuine, there 
would be a reasonable basis for the OTP to proceed with an investigation.39  
At the case level, which arises when the Prosecutor develops an investigative 
hypothesis with respect to particular suspects and factual events, admissibility requires a 
more specific and detailed analysis of any prosecutions occurring at the national level 
involving that particular suspect. Article 17 requires that the Prosecutor determine 
whether the specific case he intends to bring is being or has been investigated or 
prosecuted by national authorities. To do so, the Prosecutor must determine whether 
national authorities have investigated or prosecuted the individual subject to potential 
prosecution by the OTP for the same underlying factual events.40 Where no such 
investigation has been or is being undertaken, the case would be admissible. If an 
investigation or prosecution has been or is being undertaken by a state, the Prosecutor 
must consider whether the national investigation is genuine or not, based on the criteria 
set forth in Article 17(2).41 If the national proceedings are not genuine or the state is 
unable to prosecute, then the OTP may proceed with an investigation and prosecution. 
At both the situational and case phases, the PTC also has a role in making 
admissibility determinations. When a situation has been referred to the Court by another 
state or by the Security Council, the Prosecutor must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber 
                                                 
39 This statement assumes the other requirements of Article 53(1) are met. 
40 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, and 
VPRS6, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006). While evaluating a domestic judiciary may be difficult, the benefit of the 
formulation adopted by the Office of the Prosecutor is that the test is considerably narrower than the 
“unable or unwilling” examination found in Article 17 of the Rome Statute and requires the Prosecutor to 
determine merely whether a national investigation of the same individual based on the same factual basis 
has been initiated. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17. 
41 The Prosecutor is required to determine whether the investigation or prosecution was undertaken for the 
purpose of shielding the accused from criminal liability, whether there was an unjustified delay in the 
proceedings, whether the proceedings were not independent and impartial, or whether they were being 
undertaken in a manner inconsistent with bringing the person concerned to justice. In this second step of 
analysis, the Prosecutor may also consider whether the state is unable to prosecute pursuant to Article 17(3) 
due, for example, to a “total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system.” Rome 
Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(2), (3). 
(PTC) of his decision not to proceed with an investigation due to admissibility 
limitations.42 Where the Prosecutor seeks to proceed with an investigation initiated under 
his proprio motu powers, the PTC must approve his decision and may take admissibility 
into account in deciding whether to authorize the investigation.43 Specifically, The Rome 
Statute then requires that all states that “would normally exercise jurisdiction” be notified 
of the impending investigation.44  Such states have one month to inform the Court that 
they are or have investigated the situation and may request that the Prosecutor defer 
investigation.45 The PTC can allow such a deferral based on national prosecutorial 
efforts46 or can render the situation inadmissible as a general matter.47 
At the case phase, the PTC also has to make determinations of admissibility in its 
decisions to issue arrest warrants. Specifically, the PTC must decide whether the 
particular crimes charged in the Prosecutor’s indictment have already been investigated 
or prosecuted at the national level. Likewise, the PTC must make such a determination 
when either an accused or a state party challenges admissibility before the opening of an 
actual trial.48 Where the PTC grants a deferral, the Prosecutor can request a review of the 
decision after six-months or in the event of a “significant change of circumstances” of the 
states ability or willingness to “genuinely” investigate and prosecute.49  If at either the 
situational or case phase of an investigation or prosecution the PTC finds the case to be 
inadmissible, the Prosecutor must cease the investigation of that case and indictments 
will not be confirmed against those accused whose crimes have already been investigated 
or prosecuted. 
                                                 
42 See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1). Where the Prosecutor has initiated action based on referral 
by a state or the Security Council, the referring party can request the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the 
Prosecutor’s decision. Id.  
43 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 15. 
44 Id at art. 18(1). 
45 Id at 18(2). 
46 Id.  
47 Id at art. 19(1). 
48 For Pre-Trial Chamber jurisprudence on the admissibility determination at the arrest warrant stage and 
reference to further consideration of the issue at the trial phase, see Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Under Article 58, ¶¶ 17–18 
(Feb. 10, 2006). 
49 Id at 18(3). 
 As noted above, admissibility can be considered by the PTC both on its own 
accord50 and in response to particular challenges to admissibility by states that might 
have jurisdiction over the case or by the accused himself. Article 19 allows a challenge to 
the admissibility of a case by the accused or by a state with jurisdiction “on the ground 
that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted.”51  While 
the Statute grants the accused and the state the right to challenge admissibility, they may 
only do so once and the challenge must come prior to or at the commencement of the 
trial.52  After a challenge has been mounted or the trial has begun, the Court’s leave is 
required for any subsequent challenge to be brought, and any such challenge after the 
commencement of trial must be based on a double jeopardy claim.53   
 
B.  The Problem of Admissibility Challenges in the Case of Self-Referrals 
Though the Rome Statute provides a relatively clear and detailed set of guidelines 
for the admissibility of cases, the Statute does not specifically address questions of 
admissibility in the case of self-referrals, which were not generally contemplated at the 
time of drafting. However, the text of the Rome Statute and general principles of 
international law suggest that there may be potential difficulties with admissibility in the 
case of self-referrals for three reasons: first, an earliest opportunity requirement; second, 
a prohibition on shielding, and third, the general principles of estoppel and good faith.  
The statutory problem arises first from Article 19(4) of the Rome Statute, 
according to which a state must “make a challenge [to admissibility] at the earliest 
opportunity.”54  Where a state self-refers a case and then subsequently seeks to challenge 
admissibility, a compelling argument can be made that the state has failed to act at the 
“earliest opportunity.” Where the challenge to admissibility arises because of a 
subsequent factual development—such as a new ability to secure the custody of the 
accused—the earliest opportunity requirement might present less of a problem as long as 
the state challenging admissibility acted at the earliest opportunity after that change of 
                                                 
50 Id. at art. 19(1) 
51 Id. at art. 19(2)(a)&(b). 
52 Id. at art. 19(4). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at art. 19(5). 
circumstances. If the earliest possible opportunity requirement were not satisfied, the 
state’s admissibility challenge would, presumably, fail. 
The second statutory problem with a subsequent challenge to admissibility after a 
self-referral arises from the requirement in Article 17 of the Rome Statute that for any 
domestic accountability efforts to bar admissibility, they cannot be intended to shield the 
accused from criminal liability.55 It may well be that where a state initially self-refers to 
the Court and then seeks to challenge admissibility, the state is in fact attempting to avoid 
complete accountability for the accused due, for example, to political developments since 
the self-referral. In this case of possible shielding through an admissibility challenge, the 
state would remain able to challenge admissibility, but the PTC might give careful 
scrutiny of the reasons for that challenge and possibly even start with a presumption that 
the admissibility challenge was intended to shield the accused from complete criminal 
responsibility.  
A third potential problem with a subsequent admissibility challenge in the case of 
a self-referral arises not from the statute itself, but from the general principle of estoppel 
and the international legal duty to act in good faith.56  While the principle of estoppel has 
its historic origins in territorial disputes,57 the basic elements are applicable in any 
reliance-creating international situation.  Estoppel attaches when a sate makes a clear and 
voluntary commitment and the other party relies in good faith on that representation to 
their detriment.58  A self-referring sate certainly meets the clear and voluntary 
requirements, and a case could be made that, at least in the Ugandan situation, the ICC 
had relied on Uganda’s self-referral and would be harmed if Uganda were allowed to 
reassert jurisdiction.  The ICC’s investment of significant financial, personnel, and 
political efforts in Uganda could well be detrimentally undermined by a reassertion of 
Ugandan territorial jurisdiction, thereby raising the possibility that Uganda could be 
estopped from a subsequent admissibility challenge.   
                                                 
55 Id. at art. 17(2)(a) & art. 20(3)(a). 
56 See C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 Int’l Comp. L. Quarterly 468, 468 (“Underlying 
most formulations of the doctrine of estoppel in international law is the requirement that a State ought to be 
consistent in its attitude to a given factual or legal situation.”) 
57 See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (April 5);  
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15). 
58 D.W. Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquiescence 33 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 176, 176 (1957). 
Further, the requirement of good faith, articulated in article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties59 and the General Assembly’s Draft Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of States60 requires at the very least that states perform their treaty 
obligations to the best of their abilities and that what “has been promised be performed 
without evasion or subterfuge, honestly, and to the best of the ability of the party which 
made the promise.”61 To the degree that a state seeks to use the admissibility 
requirements of the Statute to manipulate the Court or subvert the object and purpose of 
the Rome Statute and its accountability requirements, such actions would breach the 
state’s duty of good faith. As a result, even if the admissibility challenge were otherwise 
justified, the PTC could deem it to fail as a result of the state’s breach of good faith. 
 Given the potential legal problems with an admissibility challenge after a self-
referral, a deeper inquiry into the nature of admissibility as a legal principle is needed. 
Such an understanding of the functions of admissibility in the Rome Statute and its 
impact on the operation of the Court provides a critical framework for evaluating the 
legality of admissibility challenges in cases of self-referral. 
 
II. THREE VISIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY 
 
Both the text and travaux prepairatoires of the Rome Statute are suggestive of 
three very different visions of admissibility and corresponding purposes of the 
complementarity regime found in Article 17. More specifically, the admissibility 
requirements of the Statute can be understood as a fundamental right of the accused, a 
means to protect state sovereignty, or a basic limitation on the power of the Court. Each 
of these visions of the purposes of admissibility provide insight into the appropriateness 
of an admissibility challenge after a self-referral and may suggest different answers to 
whether the PTC should allow such challenges in the Uganda situation and beyond. 
                                                 
59 “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1115 U.N.T.S 331 art. 26 (emphasis added). 
60 See Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 375(IV), annex, art. 13, U.N. GAOR 4th 
Sess.  (Dec. 6, 1949). 
61 Codification of International Law 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (SUPP.) 1, 981 (1935). 
Complementarity and challenges to admissibility were considered in great detail 
at the Rome Conference, with states presenting a range of opinions on both the purpose 
and legal structure of complementarity.62  The language contained in the Statute 
represents a series of compromises about the general nature of complementarity and how 
it fits in the schema of the Rome Statute.  While there was near universal agreement that 
complementarity was an important and necessary component of the Statute,63 sates 
differed on its purposes, the appropriate requirements for rendering a case inadmissible,64 
and the procedure for establishing and challenging admissibility.  While each of the three 
visions of admissibility discussed below highlights different elements of admissibility, 
the approach likely to be taken by the Pre-Trial Chamber will presumably represent a 
combination of and compromise amongst these competing visions of admissibility. 
 
1.  Admissibility as a Personal Right of the Accused 
A first vision of admissibility is as a personal right of the accused. This vision of 
admissibility is derived from the idea that an accused has a right both to be free of 
multiple, overlapping proceedings and to be tried by his natural or home court where 
such a court is able and willing to act.65  First, multiple trials in differing fora are clearly 
                                                 
62 See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity 41, 45-56, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT:  THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed. 1999) (recounting the key issues in 
admissibility prior to the adoption of the Rome State) [hereinafter Principle of Complementarity]. For a 
background on the development of the principle of complementarity, see Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The 
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 869 (2002). 
63 In his introduction of the admissibility issue at the 1998 Diplomatic Conference, Coordinator John 
Holmes stated “virtually all States had indicated [in Preparatory Committee discussions] the importance 
which they attached to the inclusion of the principle of complementarity in the Statute.”  M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  SUMMARY OF THE 1998 
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 188 (2005) [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE]. 
64 While most states expressed a desire to adhere to the compromise reached on the Admissibility article 
(see, e.g. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 193 (noting the Polish delegations view that “the compromise text of 
[the Admissibility] article had been achieved through long negotiations and should remain in tact”), several 
states voiced concern that the Admissibility article relied too heavily on subjective evaluations of national 
courts, favoring more deference to such courts (see, e.g. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 195, Comments of Ms. 
Li Yanduan (noting that the Chinese delegation considered that “the judicial systems of most countries 
were capable of functioning properly” and proposing limiting a determination of unwillingness to cases in 
which national law and procedure were not followed)). 
65 A basic formulation of this right appears as early as the Magna Carta, which guaranteed that "[n]o 
freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way destroyed; nor will we 
condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the 
law of the land."  (Richard Thompson translation, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA CARTA OF KING 
JOHN (1829)).  While the exact meaning of this is subject to widespread debate, a common understanding is 
inappropriate and would violate the accused’s fundamental rights such as the right to a 
free and fair trial found in, among other sources, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.66 In addition, this construction of the complementarity regime suggests 
that the accused has a right to be judged by the court which has the best ties to him and 
the acts for which he is accused, presumably the territorial or national state. Removal of 
the accused from his home court is only justified as a last resort when the home court is 
unavailable.  
In the drafting of the Rome Statute, there was general agreement that at least an 
accused person should have a right to challenge the admissibility of a case. Most 
disagreement at Rome on this point focused on whether a “suspect” under investigation 
but not yet indicted should be able to challenge admissibility.67 The ultimate choice of 
allowing the right to challenge admissibility to an accused or one “for whom a warrant or 
arrest or summons to appear has been issued”68 emphasizes that the accused’s right to 
challenge admissibility attaches at the point where the Court’s position relative to the 
accused interferes with that person’s liberty through, for example, summoning them to a 
foreign locale. 
The text of the Rome Statute suggests that such a right of the accused to challenge 
admissibility is not unlimited. An accused only has an automatic right to challenge 
admissibility once and such a challenge must be mounted prior to the initiation of trial, 
unless leave of the Court is granted and the challenge is based on a double jeopardy 
claim.69  This limitation reflects a balancing between the right of the accused to a trial in 
his home forum and the need to prevent the waste of judicial time and resources that 
                                                                                                                                                 
that a person has a right to be tried by members of his/her community, implying physical proximity.  See, 
e.g.,  RACHEL WACHETER, LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, JURISPRUDENTIAL AND 
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF JURY SERVICE, 3 JURY SERVICE IN VICTORIA, at Chapter 1, §1.8 (the phrase 'trial 
by one's peers' requires that the jury be representative of the community).  Similarly, one of the grievances 
noted in the United States Declaration of Independence was “transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for . . . 
offenses” (at ¶20).  More recently, the Princeton Principles for Universal Jurisdiction lay out nine factors 
for determining the appropriate resolution for competing jurisdictional claims, five of those factors are 
locational. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo, ed.) 2001 at Principle 8   
66 Art. 14, para. 7 (1966). 
67 Suspect remained in brackets (indicating its potential to be used in lieu of “accused”) in the 1997 reports 
from the Preparatory Commission sessions, the 1998 “Zutphen Draft” submitted at the Preparatory 
Committee’s final session, and the draft considered at the 1998 Diplomatic Conference.  See M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE 
EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE FROM 1994-1998 155-160 (2005) [hereinafter EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE]. 
.68 Rome Statute art. 19(2)(a). 
69 See supra I.A. 
would accompany removal of a case after trial had started.70  Thus while the concept of 
admissibility as a right of the accused is clearly an important element of the 
complementarity regime, this right of the accused can be subordinated to the need for 
proper functioning of the Court.  
While a vision of admissibility as a right of the accused is compelling, there are 
reasons to doubt that it fully justifies the principle. To the degree that the Rome Statute is 
viewed as transferring territorial or national jurisdiction of states parties to the Court, 
there is no reason for the accused to expect to be tried by his home court. States have in a 
variety of circumstances transferred their jurisdictional entitlements to other states or 
entities through, for example, status of forces agreements, without jeopardizing the rights 
of the accused.71 In addition, the principle of universal jurisdiction expressly embraces 
the idea that certain crimes such as those contained in the Rome Statute are so heinous 
that any state has a right to try the perpetrators, regardless of any connection to the state 
itself.72 Hence, to the degree that the right of the accused to trial in his natural court is the 
justification for complementarity, the Rome Statute must be viewed as conferring new 
rights or supplementing existing rights of the accused with respect to the appropriate 
forum for prosecution. At the very least, the vision of admissibility as a right of the 
accused suggests that irrespective of the method through which the case was referred to 
the Court, the accused maintains an actionable interest in preventing the Court from 
hearing his case where a domestic court is able and willing to undertake a genuine 
                                                 
70 See Principle of Complementarity 62 (the balance of preventing procedural misconduct and allowing 
some form of redress applied also to States). 
71 See Madeline Morris, The United States and the International Criminal Court: High Crimes and 
Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 44-45 (2001). For 
examples of status of forces agreements that include a transfer of jurisdictional entitlements, see Facilities 
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea, art. xv, paras. 1, 8 (July 9, 1966) 
(allowing Republic of Korea to exercise jurisdiction over United States citizens and corporations in Korea 
pursuant to military contracts, and reserving the right to try such persons by United States military authority 
if Korean courts declined to exercise jurisdiction). But see Diane Marie Amann, The International 
Criminal Court and the Sovereign State, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 187-98 
(Wouter G. Werner & Ige F. Dekker eds., 2004) (arguing that the transfer of jurisdiction is illegitimate). 
 Some states have limited their own exercise of universal jurisdiction to be a subsidiary principle which can 
only be invoked when the territorial and national states have failed to prosecute themselves. That approach 
would seem to reflect the right of the accused to trial by the courts of the home state where they are 
available.  
72 Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 785 (1988); 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo, ed.) 2001. 
investigation as long as such a challenge does not undermine the operation of the Court 
itself. 
 
2. Admissibility as the Protection of the Rights of States 
A second vision of admissibility is as a means to protect the rights of states 
embodied in the principle of state sovereignty.73 This view was perhaps the dominant 
frame of complementarity and admissibility voiced at Rome and would be fully 
consistent with the Statute itself being viewed as a transfer of jurisdictional entitlements 
from the national and territorial states to the ICC.74  According to this view, states parties 
transferred jurisdiction through the Rome Statute, but did so in a limited way, only 
transferring a jurisdictional entitlement to the Court where the territorial or national state 
was unable or unwilling to prosecute itself. In contrast, states retain any and all rights not 
transferred to the Court and the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court beyond those 
transferred powers would be a breach of the state’s sovereign rights and exceed the 
Court’s power under the Statute.75 
Once again, the text of the Statute reflects a compromise as evidenced by the 
travaux. In the initial stages of the discussions at Rome, several States were skeptical of 
any intrusion on state sovereignty, seeking to retain for themselves the right to prosecute 
domestically except where the national or territorial state was truly unable to act. 76 In 
contrast, other states favored a larger scope of admissible cases, encompassing ineffective 
state action in addition to inaction.77 
The divergent views of the delegations expressed in the 1995 Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, underscore this 
vision of the complementarity in the Rome Statute as a protection of state sovereignty.  
On one end, some States preferred a “strong presumption in favour of national 
jurisdiction,” citing advantages of established procedure, law and punishment, as well as 
administrative efficiencies and the interest in maintaining State responsibility and 
                                                 
73 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”). 
74 See Morris, supra note 71, at 44. 
75 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10. 
76 See Principle of Complementarity 41-42.   
77 Id. 
accountability for prosecuting crimes.78 At the other end of the spectrum was a call for 
the ICC to serve as the only venue for prosecuting extremely grave crimes. This approach 
was based on the idea of universal jurisdiction and that with respect to “a few ‘hard-core’ 
crimes” states no longer retained an exclusive right to prosecute.79   
Eventually, the Preparatory Committee settled on language based on the initial 
ILC proposal, but with a more nuanced delineation of when a case would be 
inadmissible.  This validated the intrusion of the Court into a domestic prosecution even 
when national proceedings had been undertaken or were taking place, but only if the 
proceedings were not genuine.80 After this proposal with respect to admissibility, an 
“alternative approach” was offered with a notation of the need for “further discussion.”  
The alternate admissibility language read simply: “The Court has no jurisdiction where 
the case in question is being investigated or prosecuted, or has been prosecuted, by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it.”81 However, the vast majority of delegations rejected 
this approach.82   
A further proposal by the United States, first introduced at the 1998 Preparatory 
Committee sessions demonstrated the strength of the state sovereignty frame in the 
course of the Rome Statute negotiations.  The United States proposal, eventually 
incorporated in Article 18, shifted the admissibility evaluation to the beginning stages of 
the investigative work of the Prosecutor.83  The US delegation framed the need for this 
adjustment as a protection, at the outset of a referral, of a state’s right to fully investigate 
the crimes concerned itself.84  The US proposal touched off a debate between delegations 
that considered this proposal to add unnecessary obstacles to the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction85 and those, which argued that the proposal strengthened the protection of 
state sovereignty.86  Reflecting the US efforts in consultations with other delegations and 
resultant adjustments of the original proposal, the US proposal became, for many 
                                                 
78 EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE 150-51. 
79 Id. at 152. 
80 See Principle of Complementarity 44. 
81 See EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE 145. 
82 See Principle of Complementarity 52-53. 
83 For a detailed discussion of the United States proposal, see id at 68-72. 
84 See DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 189. 
85 Id at 190, 193 (noting the stance in favor of deleting the proposed article by Belgium and Poland). 
86 Id. at 194 (reporting that Japan’s delegation “considered that [the proposed article] should be retained, 
since the principle of complementarity applied even in the early stages of an investigation.”) 
delegations, “key to their acceptance of the complementarity regime and the proprio 
motu role of the Prosecutor.”87   
Several other compromises addressed the concerns of those states that viewed the 
complementarity provisions as tipping the scales too heavily in favor of state’s rights.  
For example, a state challenge to admissibility under what would eventually become 
Article 18 subsequently limits future challenges under Article 19 to instances of 
significant change in situation.88  Rather than allow a recalcitrant state to use the article as 
a means to obstruct the work of the Prosecutor, the balance struck by the final version of 
admissibility in the statute gives states opportunities and incentives to address crimes 
through national jurisdictions but retains for the Court the authority to proceed when the 
clear intention of the state was to shield perpetrators from justice or the circumstances of 
the state made it impossible to investigate or prosecute.   
A compromise was also reached between the polar extremes of those delegations 
that preferred any state—including non-party states which had only been asked to 
cooperate in a particular investigation or arrest—to challenge admissibility and 
delegations that wanted admissibility challenges limited to states-parties to the Statute.89  
Agreement was reached on a more moderate states’ rights position, allowing for any state 
with jurisdiction to challenge admissibility.90  Allowing even non-party states to 
challenge admissibility demonstrates a commitment to protecting the rights of a state with 
jurisdiction and suggests that negotiators were uncomfortable with granting the Court 
authority unchecked by sate action.  So long as a sate acted in good faith, the delegations 
at Rome allowed that state to challenge admissibility and handle proceedings 
domestically, trusting the bar on prosecutions aimed at shielding the accused was 
sufficient protection to warrant deference to national prosecutions. 
The language eventually adopted in the Statute thus appears to reflect both the 
desire of at least some states parties to retain sovereign prerogative over the investigation 
and prosecution of international crimes and the need to create a court with the authority 
                                                 
87 Principle of Complementarity 71. 
88 Rome Statute art. 18(7). 
89 Principle of Complementarity, supra note 51, at 62. 
90 Id. at 66.  The eventually adopted language allows challenges to be made by “A State which has 
jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or 
prosecuted.”  Rome Statute, supra note 11 at art. 19(2)(b). 
and capacity to effectively “put an end to impunity.”91 The vision of the admissibility as a 
protection of states’ rights stresses the first element of this balancing and suggests that 
states retain all rights not expressly transferred to the ICC in the Rome Statute. Such a 
reading of admissibility results in a narrow interpretation of the powers transferred to the 
Court and would perhaps preference state challenges to admissibility notwithstanding 
self-referrals.92 
 
3. Admissibility as a Limitation on the Power of the ICC 
A third potential vision of admissibility is as a fundamental limitation on the 
power of the ICC. This vision is closely linked to the protection of state sovereignty 
discussed above, but emphasizes the limitations on the Court’s power rather than the 
protection of state’s rights. This vision of admissibility also rests on the idea that through 
the Rome Statute, states parties transferred strictly limited jurisdictional entitlements to 
the ICC. The Court, as a creation of the states parties themselves, has no powers beyond 
those expressly transferred to it and lacks any capacity to act beyond the narrow confines 
of the powers granted to it in the Rome Statute. This perspective provides perhaps the 
narrowest vision of complementarity and would presumably be most favorable to a state 
challenging admissibility because, should the case be deemed inadmissible, the Court 
would have no statutory power to act. 
While not the dominant frame as expressed by the drafters, the notion of a court 
of limited powers reappears repeatedly in the drafting of the Statute.  Admissibility as a 
limitation on the powers of the ICC is most apparent with respect to statutory language 
addressing when and how often the Court should investigate admissibility on its own 
accord.  Notably, the Preparatory Committee draft of the eventual Article 19 required that 
the Court “[a]t all stages of the proceedings . . . satisfy itself as to jurisdiction over a 
case.”93  Such a continuing obligation to scrutinize admissibility suggests that the Court 
has no power to act when a case is inadmissible, even if the admissibility requirements 
might have been initially satisfied. However, the continuing scrutiny language was 
                                                 
91 Rome Statute, supra note 11, at preamble para. 5. 
92 If a State’s rights vision is adopted as an object of the Rome Statute, the plain language of the 
admissibility rules would favor a State retaining its right to an admissibility challenge even in the case of 
self-referral.  VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 59, at art. 31 (1969). 
93 EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE 157. 
eventually abandoned in favor of a statutory requirement that that the Court satisfy itself 
as to jurisdiction and admissibility up to the point where a trial actually begins.94 This 
revision might be seen as undermining the view of complementarity as a limitation on the 
Court’s power because, should a case become inadmissible after the start of the trial, it 
would appear that the ICC would retain the power to prosecute, notwithstanding the 
subsequent change of circumstances on the ground that would have otherwise rendered 
the case inadmissible. At the very least, this language suggests a balancing between the 
fundamental limitations on the Court’s power and the need for an institution that can 
operate effectively within its sphere of authority.  
A further reason to question the view of admissibility as a fundamental limitation 
on the Court is the restriction on challenges to admissibility found in the Rome Statute. In 
the drafting of the Statute, the Committee as a Whole accepted without great controversy 
the limitation of one challenge to admissibility each for sates and the accused prior to 
commencement of the trial, and the requirement, though perhaps underspecified, that 
States challenge admissibility at the “earliest opportunity.”95  Indeed, the largest source of 
controversy was over whether non-party states would be able to avail themselves of the 
right to challenge.  The Italian delegation’s position, for example, was summarized as 
being “reluctant to allow States not parties, which did not share the burden of obligations 
under the Statute, to share the privilege of challenging the jurisdiction of the Court.”96  
While negotiations eventually gave non-party states the ability to challenge, that right 
was limited to states with jurisdiction, protecting the Court from bad-faith efforts to delay 
action on a case.97  If admissibility were in fact a fundamental limitation on the power of 
the Court, it would seem to have been appropriate to allow numerous challenges to 
admissibility—at least those based on new developments—and to allow such challenges 
to be made even by states without jurisdiction over the crime. 
The evolution of the Rome Statute’s provisions for challenging admissibility 
demonstrate a desire on the part of the negotiators to ensure that the Court would have 
enough authority that its prosecutorial efforts would not easily be derailed once 
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commenced.  Thus while admissibility was a limitation on the Court’s authority, it was a 
limitation that established clear boundaries for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and 
retained for the Court the powers necessary to effectively carry out its functions.98  Once 
admissibility had been determined and sustained on challenge, the Court would retain the 
authority to prosecute notwithstanding new developments on the ground. After the 
commencement of trial, admissibility could only be challenged if the accused were 
actually convicted in another jurisdiction and the continuation of proceedings before the 
ICC would breach the accused’s rights to avoid double jeopardy.99  In other words, the 
Court appears to have functional authority after the commencement of trial with respect 
to cases that might otherwise have become inadmissible. It is difficult to square that 
residual admissibility with a vision of complementarity solely as a fundamental limitation 
on the power of the Court, although some notion of a court of limited powers is clearly 
evidenced in the complementarity regime. 
 
4. Visions of Admissibility in the Practice of the ICC 
 While the case law on admissibility is still in its earliest stages, the decisions of 
the PTC in its first cases provide some insight into how the ICC Chambers understand 
admissibility and balance the three visions of admissibility identified in the Rome Statute. 
The primary decisions on admissibility to date arise in the case of Thomas Lubanga in the 
situation concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but arise only at the 
earliest stages of the proceedings against him.100 The Union of Congolese Patriots (Union 
des partroites Congolais (UPC)), under Lubanga’s leadership101 was implicated in 
widespread violence and human rights abuses in the DRC, including abducting children 
and forcing them to participate as “fighters, cooks, carriers and sex slaves.”102 The Ituri 
situation was self-referred by the DRC in 2004.  Prior to the issuance of an ICC warrant, 
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Lubanga was arrested and imprisoned in Kinshasa on domestic charges of murdering nine 
MONUC peacekeepers in March 2005.103  He was subsequently charged by the ICC with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, murder, illegal detention and torture104 in a warrant 
issued on February 10, 2006,105 and was transferred to The Hague a month later.106 
 In its initial decision as to whether to issue an arrest warrant, the PTC had to 
decide whether the case against Lubanga remained admissible, notwithstanding the fact 
that he was in domestic custody facing prosecution in Kinshasa. While the DRC did not 
challenge admissibility, the PTC noted that it had to consider admissibility on its own 
accord before issuing arrest warrants:  “an initial determination on whether the case 
against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo . . . is admissible is a prerequisite to the issuance of a 
warrant of arrest for him.”107  
The PTC found the case against Lubanga admissible because he was being 
charged by the ICC, based on separate facts, with crimes distinct from those alleged in 
the domestic Congolese warrant against him. Specifically, the Congolese warrant 
addressed Lubanga’s role in the MONUC killings, whereas the ICC warrant focused on 
his conscription of children into his militia group.108 The PTC noted that while inability 
under Article 17(1) & (3) no longer appeared to be a barrier to the DRC asserting national 
jurisdiction,109 because the proceedings in the DRC did not specifically reference the 
conscription of children into hostilities, the case remained admissible.110 In order for a 
case to be inadmissible “national proceedings must encompass both the person and the 
conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court.”111  Having affirmed that no 
domestic case against Lubanga for the same charges had been initiated, the Chamber 
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declined to make a formal analysis of “unwillingness or inability” beyond its earlier 
reference.112  
While it remains possible that admissibility will be challenged or further 
examined as the case against Lubanga proceeds to trial, thus far the PTC has balanced 
two of the distinct visions of admissibility presented above—admissibility as a protection 
of states’ rights and admissibility as a limitation on the powers of the Court—with the 
functional needs of the Court to maintain the power to fulfill its mandate. On the one 
hand, the PTC scrupulously examined the admissibility of the case against Lubanga on its 
own accord before issuing arrest warrants and thereby ensured that the Court was not 
stepping beyond the limited powers provided for in the Statute or encroaching on the 
rights of states. On the other hand, the Chamber imposed the requirement, not necessarily 
evident from the statute, for a case to be inadmissible, domestic proceedings must include 
the same conduct charged by the ICC. That element of the PTC’s decision ensured the 
Court sufficient leeway to carryout its functions. While, as yet, the Chamber has not 
adopted the vision of complementarity as a right of the accused, should an accused 
himself challenge admissibility, that element of complementarity might well become 
more apparent in the Court’s jurisprudence. As the jurisprudence of the PTC stands to 
date, the ICC appears to view admissibility primarily as a means to protect states’ rights,  
however the limitations imposed by such a vision are not absolute and may be 
circumscribed by the functional needs of the institution. 
 
 
III. THE POTENTIAL UGANDAN ADMISSIBILITY CHALLENGE 
 
Throughout late 2007 and early 2008, events on the ground at the peace 
negotiations between the LRA and the Ugandan government in Juba, South Sudan, have 
been unfolding rapidly. At the time of writing in mid April 2008, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict the ultimate outcome of those negotiations, though a final peace 
agreement is supposed to be signed and may lead to a complete demobilization of the 
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LRA.113 For the purposes of argument, the sections that follow assume that such a peace 
deal is ultimately signed and that Uganda and the LRA proceed to implement the June 
2007 and February 2008 agreements on accountability and reconciliation. This part of the 
chapter first considers the terms of the two agreements reached between the LRA and the 
Ugandan government and then turns to the range of possible domestic accountability 
options available to Uganda in light of those agreements.  
 
A. Domestic Justice: The June 2007 and February 2008 Accountability Agreements 
As part of ongoing efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict in 
northern Uganda, the LRA and the Ugandan government reached an initial agreement on 
justice and accountability in June 2007. The agreement seeks to promote “lasting peace 
with justice” through a balancing of the need for peace with the obligation to “prevent… 
impunity” and the “requirements of the Rome Statute.”114 The agreement anticipates the 
establishment of a domestic criminal justice mechanism to provide accountability for the 
most serious crimes committed during the conflict in the north. Specifically, the 
agreement calls for “formal criminal and civil justice mechanisms” to “be applied” to 
those responsible for “serious crimes or human rights obligations” through a “legal 
framework in Uganda.”115 Such language appears fully consistent with the exercise of 
Uganda’s primary jurisdiction over Kony and other LRA indictees. In fact, the language 
of the agreement appears to anticipate an admissibility challenge, noting “Uganda has 
institutions and mechanisms … provided for and recognized under national laws capable 
of addressing the crimes and human rights violations committed” in the conflict.116 
This first agreement however offers two key concessions to the LRA leadership that 
may have troubling implications for a Ugandan challenge to admissibility. First, the 
agreement suggests that, notwithstanding the use of “formal courts,” “alternative 
penalties and sanctions…shall apply and replace existing penalties with respect to serious 
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crimes.”117 While such penalties are supposed to “reflect the gravity of the crimes,” they 
remain unspecified in the initial agreement. Depending on how such penalties are 
ultimately crafted, they might or might not meet the admissibility tests specified in 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, namely that the proceedings were not intended to shield 
the accused and that they were consistent with “an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”118 Second, the June 2007 agreement calls for the use of “traditional justice 
mechanisms” such as mato oput “as a central part of the framework for 
accountability.”119 Such traditional justice mechanisms generally are based around 
forgiveness ceremonies rather than criminal sanction and, as such, would presumably not 
meet the intent to bring to justice standard of Article 17.120 Again, the June 2007 
Agreement does not specify the scope of applicability of such traditional justice 
mechanisms, but they are clearly intended to be a significant component of 
accountability. 
 After months of negotiation and consultations within the LRA and the Ugandan 
government, a second and more detailed Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability 
and Reconciliation was concluded in February 2008. This agreement seeks to provide the 
specific frameworks for the implementation of the principles articulated in the June 2007 
agreement. More specifically, the Annexure calls for the establishment of a “special 
division of the High Court of Uganda” to “try individuals who are alleged to have 
committed serious crimes during the conflict.”121 The anticipated special division is 
supposed to undertake investigations under the authority of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the Annexure does not 
specifically mention alternative sentences, that language as contained in the June 2007 
Agreement would appear to remain applicable. In addition, the Annexure again notes that 
the special division may recognize “traditional and community justice processes in 
proceedings.”122  
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In light of these developments, the PTC submitted a request to the Government of 
Uganda on 29 February 2008, seeking further information on the steps Uganda was 
taking to implement the agreements, the proposed competence of the special division of 
the High Court, the categories of offences subject to traditional or alternative justice, and 
the impact of the agreements on the ICC arrest warrants.123 In a response dated 27 March 
2008, Uganda clarifies that “formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be applied to 
any individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes or human rights 
violations.”124 The letter further specifies that the government will appoint a task force 
for determining the necessary implementing legislation and will proceed with the 
establishment of the special division after a final peace agreement is signed. With respect 
to issues of admissibility, the Government’s response provides insight into the potential 
interactions between the ICC and the Ugandan High Court. The Solicitor General’s letter 
notes: “The special division of the High Court is not meant to supplant the work of the 
International Criminal Court and accordingly those individuals who were indicted by the 
International Criminal Court will have to be brought before the special division…”125 The 
letter further provides the basis for a future Ugandan challenge to admissibility, noting 
that “Uganda’s inability to have the LRA leadership tried” was due to the fact that the 
LRA leaders were “beyond the borders of Uganda.” The letter continues: “It is expected 
that once the agreement is signed and the Lord’s Resistance Army submits to Ugandan 
jurisdiction as required, the perpetrators of atrocities in northern [sic] [Uganda], the 
indictees inclusive, shall be subject to the full force of the law.”126 
 
 
B. Mechanisms of Domestic Justice 
The agreements reached to date between the LRA and the Ugandan government 
as well as the exchange between the Ugandan Government and the ICC suggest that 
Uganda will pursue a dual track strategy with respect to accountability. Those most 
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responsible for international crimes committed in the conflict who have not yet received 
amnesty will face formal justice with special procedures and, possibly, alternative 
sentences.  Given that Uganda has already granted amnesty to members of the LRA who 
have been demobilized, such formal justice would likely apply only to those LRA 
members who remain at-large, including the ICC indictees.127 Those who committed 
lesser offences will, presumably, face limited accountability through an alternative form 
of justice based around traditional justice ceremonies. Any Ugandan challenge to 
admissibility will relate only to the justice mechanisms utilized for LRA officials indicted 
by the ICC, presumably the formal justice provided by the yet-to-be-developed special 
division of the High Court. The key question, then, is whether the domestic justice 
utilized for ICC indictees will meet the complementarity requirements of the Rome 
Statute. A number of options are available to Uganda in this process with considerably 
different implications for such an admissibility challenge. 
 
1. Amnesty 
The present legal framework in Uganda provides for what is essentially a blanket 
amnesty for demobilizing rebels who apply for amnesty through a simple process with 
the Amnesty Commission.128 The Amnesty Act of 2000 was extended by the Government 
of Uganda in May 2006 for an additional two-year period and remains applicable. Under 
existing law, even ICC indictees who submit to Ugandan domestic jurisdiction could 
apply for amnesty and would, thereby, be immune from Ugandan domestic 
jurisdiction.129 While there are many deficiencies in the existing amnesty process in 
Uganda, as long as such amnesty applies only to non-ICC indictees, the Amnesty Act 
would not present a problem for an admissibility challenge. It would, nonetheless, limit 
the use of formal justice mechanism to those members of the LRA who have yet to apply 
for amnesty. If, however, amnesty is offered to or, perhaps even if it is statutorily 
available to ICC indictees, it would presumably deprive Ugandan courts of domestic 
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jurisdiction and thereby render any Ugandan admissibility challenge moot. Hence, should 
Uganda seek to implement the February 2008 Annexure plan for a special division of the 
High Court, it must reform the Amnesty Act so as, at the very least, to exclude ICC 
indictees from amnesty. 
  
2. Courts martial 
Perhaps the most effective means to provide domestic accountability for ICC 
indictees would be to conduct a trial through Uganda’s military tribunals, which are 
already well established and clearly have the competence to undertake such 
investigations. This has been the preferred method of trying sensitive, politically 
implicated crimes in the past. There are, however, two problems with such an approach. 
First, the February 2008 Annexure specifies that military courts will not be used as a 
mechanism for accountability for serious crimes.130 Second, the constitutionality of using 
military tribunals to prosecute individuals not in the military is questionable. In 2005, the 
trial of the opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye provoked a constitutional conflict when 
he was detained by the military to face a Court Martial on charges of terrorism and 
illegal-weapon possession.131 Uganda’s High Court ruled that the exercise of military 
jurisdiction over civilians was unconstitutional132 under Article 126(1) of the Ugandan 
Constitution.133 Hence, despite the potential effectiveness of military courts martial as a 
means of accountability for the LRA, it appears highly unlikely they will play a role in 
the process. 
 
3.  A Special Division of the High Court 
By far the most likely means of formal accountability for the LRA will be through 
the use of a special division of the High Court. Considerable implementing legislation 
will be needed in Ugandan domestic law to provide for the operation of such a special 
division in conformity with the June 2007 and February 2008 Agreements, though a 
potentially effective framework for such trials does exist in Ugandan law. Three key 
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issues must be addressed to ensure the effective functioning of a special division of the 
High Court and to provide a reasonable likelihood that such domestic trials would bar 
admissibility before the ICC: 1) potential charges under Ugandan law; 2) the operating 
procedures of the special division; and 3) the range of possible sentences. How the 
Ugandan government deals with these three issues is likely to have significant bearing on 
the ultimate success of an admissibility challenge. 
 The ICC indictment against Joseph Kony contained 33 separate charges 
involving nine international criminal acts: enslavement, sexual enslavement, rape, 
inducing rape, attack against civilians, cruel treatment, inhumane acts, pillaging, and 
murder.134  Under Uganda’s Penal Code, these ICC charges could be translated into the 
following domestic charges: kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to 
grievous harm; slavery;135 detention with sexual intent;136 rape;137 doing grievous 
harm;138 theft;139 and murder.140  The Penal Code also establishes that any person who 
“does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to 
commit the offense” is a principal offender, deemed guilty of performing the act, as is 
any person who procures another to commit the act.141  If Uganda charged Kony with all 
of the above crimes, it could likely meet the requirement cited by PTC-I in the Lubanga 
case that each person and count charged in the ICC warrant be charged in the domestic 
proceedings.  Thus the question would simply be whether or not the Chamber is willing 
to allow Uganda to retake ownership of the LRA trials if it intends to genuinely pursue 
domestic justice. 
Second, Uganda will have to develop an appropriate procedural framework for the 
trial of the LRA leadership in the proposed special division. Such a procedural 
framework is indicated, at least in broad terms, in the February 2008 Annexure and 
would have to comply both with the Ugandan constitution and key procedural guarantees 
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of international human rights instruments. More specifically, that procedural framework 
would have to guarantee that certain key elements of Article 17 of the Rome Statute are 
met, namely that the proceedings are conducted “independently and impartially” and that 
there is not “an unjustified delay” in the proceedings.142 As soon as practical after the 
signing of a final peace agreement, Uganda will need to pass appropriate implementing 
legislation for the operation of the special division of the high court. 
Perhaps the most challenging element of the legal framework for domestic 
prosecutions relates to the sentences to be imposed by the special division. The June 2007 
Agreement clearly references the establishment of a “regime of alternative penalties and 
sanctions.”143 The nature of the negotiations between the LRA and the Ugandan 
government during late 2007 and 2008 suggests that this regime of alternative sentences 
is a sine qua non of any peace deal and a strong incentive for Kony and his followers to 
submit to Ugandan domestic jurisdiction.144  
Under existing Ugandan law, the likely charges Kony and others would face 
could carry sanctions up to and including death,145 whereas the ICC could apply a 
maximum sentence of life in prison.146 Hence, under existing law, it appears likely that 
the range of sentences Kony and others might face would be fully consistent with the 
intent to bring to justice requirement of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. However, should 
the Ugandan government revise the applicable penalties available to the special division, 
as suggested by the June 2007 Agreement and demanded by the LRA, to provide far 
lighter sentences or even house arrest, it is possible such a sentencing regime could be 
seen by the PTC as a means of shielding the accused from the ICC or as inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the accused to justice. As a result, the Ugandan admissibility challenge 
might fail.  
The key for implementation of meaningful domestic justice that would render the 
cases inadmissible before the ICC is to find a sanction regime that encourages the LRA to 
surrender but that still meets the tests of Article 17. Article 17 requires domestic 
proceedings are based on an intent to bring the accused to justice. As it is extremely 
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difficult to parse the intent of a state in such regard, the PTC may have reference to the 
penalties available under a domestic proceeding as a proxy for the state’s genuine intent 
to bring the accused to justice. At present, however, such a regime of penalties must be 
designed with little guidance from the PTC as to what kinds of sanctions would meet the 
Article 17 threshold. It is further unclear the extent to which the Chamber’s decision on 
the genuineness of the domestic process would be based on the outcome of the trial. The 
language of the Rome Statute seems to indicate that a result that shields the accused from 
justice would be impermissible, yet it makes reference only to the “proceedings” to 
determine willingness to prosecute. 147 It is therefore difficult to tell if the Court’s 
decision would be based on the process undertaken or the final verdict reached or 
sentence given. 148   
A purely process-focused inquiry might be problematic due to the inherent 
difficulty of assessing the genuineness of the process without reference to the results.  It 
would appear inconsistent with Article 17 for the accused to nominally face severe 
penalties but to be discretionally sentenced to terms that do not match the severity of the 
crimes.  Therefore, if the PTC makes its determination after a trial, it may look at the 
difference between the verdict reached and typical sentences within a jurisdiction to 
determine if a “national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility,”149 and may look at any pre-trial agreements 
reached between the government and the accused. In the Uganda case, this may be 
particularly relevant as a national decision has been made on accountability and it will be 
incumbent upon the Government to demonstrate that the agreement was not reached to 
shield the indictees from responsibility.  In order to do so, it may be necessary to 
demonstrate that any gap between a typical sentence for the crimes charged and an actual 
sentence given is consistent with normal variations in sentencing, or, at least, that the gap 
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does not reflect an unwillingness to hold the accused accountable for their crimes. If, in 
contrast, the PTC rules on admissibility before the domestic trial is completed, the 
ultimate result of the domestic process will still be undetermined. In such a circumstance, 
the PTC will have no choice but to focus its inquiry on the domestic process, rather than 
result. In that circumstance, the PTC may look at the sentences available to the domestic 
court as a proxy for the intent to bring the accused to justice and consider whether the 
range of available domestic sentences in the particular proceeding diverges from those 
available in typical domestic cases. 
 
4.  Traditional Justice 
A third option available to Uganda is the use of traditional justice, as called for in 
both the June 2007 Agreement and February 2008 Annexure. Such traditional justice 
mechanisms are clearly the strong preference of the LRA indictees and might include 
modified versions of various local processes such as Mato Oput, Cuol Kwor, Kayo Cuk, 
Ailuc and Tonu ci Koka.150  These mechanisms generally seek community healing and 
reintegration through confession, repentance and token restitution, aimed at 
demonstrating remorse and signaling a new start for all involved.151  They do not, 
however, generally provide for criminal sanction. 
The March 2007 Letter from the Ugandan Solicitor General to the ICC Registrar 
suggests that these traditional justice mechanisms will only apply to lower level offenders 
and would not constitute a part of the formal justice mechanisms applicable to ICC 
indictees. While there are serious concerns about the appropriateness of traditional justice 
mechanisms for serious offences committed in a conflict and with respect to the frequent 
exclusion of women from these ceremonies, as long as traditional justice is only utilized 
for offenders who have not been indicted by the ICC, the use of traditional justice would 
be irrelevant to any admissibility considerations. 
Should, however, traditional justice be used as part of the formal justice 
mechanism applicable to ICC indictees, it could present significant problems for a 
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Ugandan challenge to admissibility. Specifically, should the participation in a traditional 
justice ceremony constitute a part of the sentences handed down by the special division of 
the High Court, such a sentence could be viewed as inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the accused to justice. Similarly, should the procedures adopted by the special division 
incorporate elements of traditional justice, it is possible the ultimate proceedings might 
not be deemed independent and impartial. Hence, the separation of traditional justice 
mechanisms from the formal court proceedings envisioned by the February 2008 
Annexure might be critical to the success of any admissibility challenge.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING ADMISSIBILITY, SHAPING DOMESTIC JUSTICE 
 
Assuming a final peace deal is reached and the LRA disarms to face domestic 
accountability, an admissibility challenge will, presumably, be brought before the PTC, 
on the grounds that the crimes committed by ICC indictees are being investigated and 
prosecuted in a domestic forum and that Uganda is both able and willing to provide 
accountability domestically. The approach taken by PTC II to such a challenge will have 
considerable implications both for the pursuit of peace and justice in Uganda and for the 
broader contours of acceptable domestic processes under Article 17. Given the 
circumstances of Uganda’s referral and the on-going peace negotiations, the results of 
such a challenge may significantly impact the Court’s legitimacy and future 
effectiveness.  On one hand, rejecting a challenge to admissibility, particularly if a peace 
agreement has been reached that is conditional on removal of the ICC warrants, may 
result in a perceived lack of respect for state sovereignty and may undercut state support 
for the Court.  On the other hand, if the Court is seen as compromising justice by 
allowing the LRA leaders to escape meaningful justice, it may seriously weaken both the 
moral authority of the ICC and its deterrent effect.  Such a ruling might also create 
incentives for States and suspects to use the ICC as a negotiation tool, rather than an 
institution of justice.   
This final section of the chapter first considers two potential admissibility 
challenges that could be brought in the Uganda situation—one by the Ugandan 
Government and one by an indictee such as Joseph Kony. The section then turns to the 
broader implications of any potential PTC ruling on admissibility and the ways in which 
the PTC may be able to help shape domestic justice processes in the future. 
 
A. An Admissibility Challenge by the Government of Uganda 
Uganda has jurisdiction over any crimes committed by ICC indictees and, 
pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, is therefore empowered to challenge 
admissibility on the grounds that “it is investigating or prosecuting the case.”152 Such a 
challenge brought by the Ugandan government would likely raise three key questions for 
consideration by the PTC: (1) is Ugandan estopped from challenging admissibility or has 
it somehow waived the right to challenge admissibility through its self-referral? (2) has 
Uganda raised the admissibility challenge at the earliest possible opportunity? and (3) do 
the proposed domestic proceedings in Uganda meet the tests laid out in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute? 
Framed in terms of the visions of admissibility noted above, a Ugandan 
admissibility challenge would assert that, given Uganda’s newfound ability and 
willingness to prosecute, any enforcement action by the ICC would interfere with 
Uganda’s sovereignty and would exceed the jurisdictional entitlements transferred to the 
ICC through the Rome Statute. Such an argument would adopt the visions of 
admissibility as a protection of state sovereignty and as a limit on the powers of the Court 
discussed in Pat II, above.  
Should the PTC approach the question from the perspective of admissibility as a 
fundamental limitation on the power of the Court, the estoppel argument carries little 
weight. If the Court lacks the power to proceed where a domestic court is able and 
willing to undertake its own investigation and prosecution, then the Ugandan self-referral 
should have little or no bearing on the ultimate powers of the Court or its determination 
of admissibility. In contrast, if the PTC views admissibility as a protection of state 
sovereignty, then the estoppel argument may be more convincing. By self-referring the 
case, it may be that Uganda has waived the rights it would have otherwise had to 
challenge admissibility.  
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As noted above, however, the vision of admissibility as a protection of state 
sovereignty appears to be balanced against the need for the proper functioning of the 
Court. Assuming that any Ugandan challenge to admissibility is appropriately made 
before the commencement of trial, it is unlikely that a PTC finding of inadmissibility 
would in any way interfere with the effective operation of the Court or undermine the 
goals articulated in the preamble to the Rome Statute of ending impunity. Thus, even 
from the perspective of admissibility as a protection of state sovereignty, the estoppel 
claim should not stand in the way of the PTC rendering the case inadmissible based on 
genuine domestic proceedings. 
Perhaps a more difficult consideration with respect to a Ugandan challenge to 
admissibility relates to the timing of such a challenge. Statutorily, Uganda is only entitled 
to one admissibility challenge.153 Such a challenge must be based on clear evidence that 
Uganda is both able and willing to prosecute in its own courts in satisfaction of the 
requirements of Article 17. Yet, such a challenge must also be made at the “earliest 
opportunity.”154  This suggests a potential contradiction, or at least an inconsistency, in 
the operation of Article 19.  For example, should Uganda challenge admissibility prior to 
conducting a trial, it might not be able to satisfy the Court that it in fact was “willing,” in 
the Article 17 sense, to genuinely prosecute the accused.  However, if Uganda waits to 
challenge admissibility after starting a domestic trial, the PTC could surely find that the 
challenge was not made at the earliest possible opportunity.  
The purpose of the earliest possible opportunity requirement in Article 19(5) is 
presumably to both maximize the efficiency of proceedings, such that the ICC does not 
waste resources on an investigation or prosecution only to have the case subsequently 
deemed inadmissible when such an admissibility challenge could have been brought at an 
earlier time, and to incentive states with jurisdiction to promptly assume responsibility 
for prosecuting indictees or potential indictees. While these are both valid goals, the 
object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to create a court of complementary jurisdiction  
that preferences national prosecutions where they are possible. Reading the earliest 
possible opportunity requirement consistently with that intent and purpose of the Statute 
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suggests allowing some leeway in terms of the timing of a challenge and not using the 
timing requirement to block otherwise genuine assertions of national jurisdiction.  As 
long as the Ugandan challenge is brought before the ICC expends further resources in 
apprehending or prosecuting the accused, the purpose of Article 19(5) would likely be 
satisfied and the ICC would not be harmed by an unnecessary delay by the Ugandan 
government.  
However, this does not resolve the problem of when such a challenge would be 
resolved.  It is unclear how the Chamber would decide an Article 19 challenge without 
reference to the proceedings as a whole, including the result/verdict.  As a result, the 
“earliest opportunity” to challenge may not correspond with the earliest opportunity for 
the Court to decide such a challenge.  It may be that the only practical way to proceed is 
for the Court to require that the challenge be made as soon as a threshold showing can be 
made that a genuine process is underway, but to defer deciding on the challenge until 
more evidence, in the form of actual progress towards justice is shown. This possibility of 
a delayed decision on admissibility would have the added benefit of involving the 
territorial state and the PTC in a potential dialogue as to the nature of domestic 
proceedings and creating on-going pressure on the territorial state to provide meaningful 
justice. 
If this is the case, in order to meet the standards of Article 17, Uganda will have 
to provide compelling evidence that it is in fact undertaking genuine domestic 
proceedings. That, in turn, will require far more than just an illusive signature on a peace 
deal. Specifically, it is likely that the PTC would demand evidence that the accused are in 
fact in Ugandan custody and that the Ugandan judiciary has taken action against them, 
presumably in the form of a domestic investigation or even domestic indictment. Ideally, 
then, before initiating an admissibility challenge, the Ugandan government would wait 
until it had the necessary legal framework in place to prosecute, had a signed final peace 
deal, had secured custody over the accused, and had initiated domestic proceedings. 
Although such a challenge could, theoretically be made at an earlier time, waiting until a 
compelling case can be made that the government is in fact able and willing to prosecute 
will probably be the most effective strategy to convince the PTC to render the case 
inadmissible. 
Finally, the PTC will have to consider whether the proposed Ugandan domestic 
proceedings meet the tests of admissibility in Article 17 of the Statute. Given the limited 
information presently available about the actual structure of such proceedings and the 
scant jurisprudence on admissibility from the ICC to date, detailed speculation as to how 
the PTC will rule is inappropriate. On one end of the spectrum, however, it would appear 
that accountability based solely on traditional justice would be insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Article 17. On the other end of the spectrum, a standard domestic trial 
with the full range of potential sanctions ordinarily available for equivalent charges 
would likely satisfy Article 17. The difficulties, of course, arise with respect to the far 
more likely result, namely a special domestic trial before the High Court with alternative 
sanctions.  
In that likely middle ground, the critical questions for PTC analysis will likely be 
whether the sentences available to the special division of the High Court are indicative of 
an intent to bring the accused to justice and whether the special division’s procedures can 
result in an independent and impartial proceeding. Should either the ultimate sentences 
rendered or the range of sentences available to the special division appear too limited, the 
PTC could well determine that the case remains admissible. Should the sentences appear 
too severe, the LRA may fail to submit to Ugandan jurisdiction at all. In order to sustain 
an admissibility challenge, then, the legislation implementing the proposed special 
division must ensure that, even if a regime of alternative sentences is adopted, those 
sentences retain the potential severity to indicate a clear intent to bring the accused to 
justice. To that end, the Ugandan government would be well advised to ensure that the 
low end of penal sanctions available to the special division is not out of proportion with 
the low end of sentences regularly available for such crimes and that the special division 
maintain the flexibility to impose severe punishments (though not necessarily the death 
penalty) should it so choose.  
 
B. An Admissibility Challenge by an Indictee 
Article 19 of the Rome Statute also allows an indictee of the Court to bring an 
admissibility challenge to the PTC. Such a challenge by an indictee raises many of the 
same questions as would a challenge by the Ugandan Government. However, in the case 
of a challenge by an indictee, the PTC may well adopt a vision of admissibility based 
around the rights of the accused himself, rather than on the protection of state 
sovereignty. This alternate vision of admissibility could well have important 
consequences for the ultimate outcome of the challenge. The estoppel argument, which 
might limit the success of an admissibility challenge by the government would be 
inapplicable in the case of a challenge by an accused, precisely because the accused was 
not involved in the self-referral and could not be said to have waived his rights to trial in 
the natural or home forum. Similarly, the earliest opportunity requirement may be less 
problematic for the accused since the accused would only know that he would be 
prosecuted in a domestic forum once he was indicted by domestic authorities. As long as 
the indictee’s challenge was timely brought after the filing of domestic charges against 
him, he should be able to satisfy the earliest opportunity requirement. 
With respect to the evaluation of the proposed domestic proceedings in an 
admissibility challenge brought by an indictee, the basic tests of Article 17 would remain 
the same as they were in the case of an admissibility challenge by the government. 
However, the vision of admissibility as a protection of the rights of the accused might 
change the perspective of the PTC. Specifically, the PTC might look somewhat more 
forgivingly on procedural deficiencies in the domestic forum. After all, the accused’s 
challenge to admissibility would be a clear reflection of his preference for prosecution in 
the domestic forum despite any eminencies that such a forum might have. That said, in 
the case of a challenge by an accused, the PTC might well examine more strictly whether 
the domestic forum was indicative of a genuine intent to bring the accused to justice. The 
PTC might, for example, want to fully satisfy itself that the accused was not challenging 
admissibility simply out of a desire for a perhaps lighter sentence available in a domestic 
forum. Such stricter scrutiny of the intent to bring the accused to justice could lead the 
PTC to find that a regime of alternative sentences under domestic law would leave the 
case admissible before the ICC. 
In the case of a challenge by the accused, one further issue arises: must the 
accused already be in custody before bringing an admissibility challenge. This is a 
particularly important consideration in Uganda, where Kony might well prefer to 
challenge admissibility before submitting to Ugandan jurisdiction such that he could not 
be transferred to the ICC upon surrender. The accused’s right to challenge admissibility 
would appear to attach at the time that the ICC’s activities interferes with the accused’s 
personal liberty, namely at the time an arrest warrant is circulated against him.155 From 
that perspective, the accused would be entitled to challenge admissibility from the time 
the arrest warrant is issued. However, the success of any challenge by the accused ought 
to require that the accused be in custody of either the state seeking to prosecute or the 
ICC. Unless the accused is in custody, the state seeking to prosecute can not effectively 
do so and, hence, the admissibility challenge should fail. 
 
C. Admissibility as an Opportunity to Shape Domestic Justice Processes 
 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute makes clear that the ultimate goal of the ICC is 
to “put an end to impunity.”156  As one of the authors has argued extensively elsewhere, 
to the degree that the goal of ending impunity can be achieved through domestic 
institutions, the ultimate purpose of the ICC is still served and, perhaps can even be 
achieved far more effectively and efficiently than it could be by the Court operating 
alone.157 In fact, the Preamble to the Rome Statute recognizes the “duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”158 
Given the limited resources available to the ICC and the fact that such an international 
tribunal can, at best, prosecute a few individuals each year,159 the ultimate goal of ending 
impunity may be best served through a policy of positive or proactive complementarity, 
whereby the ICC seeks to encourage and perhaps even assist national jurisdictions in 
undertaking their own investigations and prosecutions as an alternative to international 
prosecution.160  
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While the implementation of a policy of proactive complementarity might 
ordinarily be seen as falling within the remit of the Prosecutor who could, for example, 
use the threat of ICC investigation to encourage national jurisdictions to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes themselves, in the case of an early admissibility challenge, 
such as that which may be brought in the Uganda situation, the PTC may have a key role 
to play in promoting the shape and structure of domestic justice efforts.  More 
specifically, national governments will look to the jurisprudence of the PTC to determine 
the acceptable range of domestic proceedings that can satisfy Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. Particularly where states in on-going conflicts seek to design judicial 
mechanisms that balance the need to secure the peace with the obligation to provide 
justice, they will look to decisions from the PTC to determine the flexibility they retain to 
satisfy those two potentially conflicting goals. The Ugandan case will likely provide that 
critical precedent. 
From this perspective of balancing peace and justice in conflict and post-conflict 
environments, an admissibility challenge from Uganda gives the PTC an extraordinary 
opportunity to begin to map out the contours of acceptable domestic proceedings.  In 
setting those contours, however, the PTC must tread carefully. If its reading of the Statute 
is too restrictive as to the design of domestic proceedings, the PTC runs the risk of 
destabilizing a much needed peace process and perhaps exposing the Court to accusations 
of prolonging conflict and standing in the way of international peace and security. In 
contrast, should the PTC grant Uganda too much leeway, for example by allowing the 
government to undertake domestic prosecutions with maximum sentences of, for 
example, limited house arrest, it could undermine the goals of justice and accountability 
at the heart of the Rome Statute and irreparably damage the Court’s reputation. 
Should the Uganda situation result in an admissibility challenge, the PTC will 
face perhaps its greatest test to date. But, it also has an exceptional opportunity. The PTC 
will have to strike the right balance between granting states freedom to design domestic 
judicial responses to help end a conflict and the legitimate demands for justice and 
accountability. In the Uganda case, that balance may well lie in finding the right regime 
of alternative sanctions. Uganda will have to present a far more detailed proposal for 
domestic accountability to the PTC and the Court will have to respond. Ideally, both sides 
will recognize the goal of a mutually acceptable solution, constrained on one hand by the 
requirements of justice in the Rome Statute and on the other by the need for peace and 
stability. That recognition will hopefully lead the Ugandan government to aim higher 
than it  otherwise would with respect to justice and sentencing and lead the PTC to accept 
something less than perfect accountability.  
The difficulty for both sides in this process is that they are operating largely in the 
dark with little guidance as to either the PTC’s interpretation of Article 17 or the ultimate 
outcome of a domestic process in Uganda. If the Ugandan government’s proposed 
domestic process presented in an admissibility challenge is inadequate, the PTC will be 
fully justified in deeming the case still admissible before the ICC. The PTC should, 
however, take that opportunity to provide guidance as to what would constitute a 
sufficient domestic proceeding to satisfy Article 17, grant the Government the 
opportunity to revise the domestic proceedings if need be, and allow a second 
admissibility challenge as appropriate. In the process, however, the PTC will send a 
powerful signal to states and the international community as to the flexibility states retain 
to resolve internal conflicts despite being party to the Rome Statute, the acceptability of 
compromises between peace and justice, and the Court’s perception of its own role at the 
intersection of law and politics, peace and justice. 
  
